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1. Introduction 
This is a tough one. Clearly, neither of us is Allen Newell, and there 
is no way that we can do the job he would have liked to have done 
in responding to these thought-provoking reviews of Unified Theories of 
Cognition (henceforth, UTC). However, it was very important to Allen-- 
and is very important to us--that  the work on Soar and unified theories of 
cognition carry on. So, here we will do what we can based on our combined 
understanding of Soar, cognitive science, Allen, and how he would have 
likely responded to the issues raised by these reviews. In this latter, we have 
been greatly aided by a prepublication print of [ 12] that was graciously 
provided to us by the editors of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, and by 
Newell's follow-on paper to UTC [13]. In general, we will try to be clear 
about when we are conveying how we think Allen would have responded, 
and when we are just giving our own views. 
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UTC has three principal themes: 
(1) "Psychology has arrived at the possibility of unified theories of 
cognition--theories that gain their power by positing a single sys- 
tem of mechanisms that operate together to produce the full range 
of human cognition. I do not say they are here. But they are within 
reach and we should strive to attain them" (p. 1 ). 
(2) There is a common foundation underlying cognitive science. 
(3) Soar is a candidate unified theory of cognition that is useful as an 
exemplar of the concepts introduced in the book. 
The first theme is most contentious among traditional experimental psy- 
chologists. As none of the present reviewers fit this mold, it is not too 
surprising that this issue is not a major source of concern for them. Most 
of the reviewers range from neutral (i.e., they don't mention it) to strong 
support. The one exception is Minsky, who is "not sure that this is a good 
idea". However, our impression is that Minsky is really disagreeing with 
a stronger form of this theme than Newell actually intended. By "unified 
theory" Newell was referring to any theory that integrates together a set of 
mechanisms that are intended to model a broad swath of human cognition. 
Newell's (and our) approach to building such a theory is biased towards 
having a small set of mechanisms that produce most of the action through 
their interactions (an issue that we will get back to later). However, the call 
for the development of unified theories is not limited to just this form of 
unification. In particular, an integrated architecture built out of a, possibly 
large, set of specialized modules--such as the Society of Mind theory might 
ultimately lead to--seems well within the scope of the call. 
Though the first theme was clearly the central one in UTC, Minsky's 
comments were the only ones about it, so we won't say anything more about 
it in the remainder of this response. 
The second theme covers basic material on behaving systems, knowledge 
systems, representation, machines and computation, symbols, architectures, 
intelligence, search and problem spaces, preparation and deliberation, sys- 
tem levels, and the time scale of human action. Much of this material is 
common knowledge by now in cognitive science, though still by no means 
universally accepted (in particular by those more closely tied to the structure 
of the brain). The new material that might be expected to raise the most 
controversy comprises: 
(1) The refinement of the notion of symbol and the resulting distinction 
between symbols and representation. In Newell's usage, a symbol is 
a pattern that provides access to distal structures (so that local pro- 
cessing can make use of structures which are initially not localized). 
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Symbols are involved whenever such distal access occurs. A repre- 
sentation, on the other hand, is defined by encoding and decoding 
functions, such that if you decode the situation that results from 
applying an encoded transformation to an encoded situation, then 
you have exactly the situation that would have been generated if the 
original transformation had been applied to the original situation; 
that is: 
Decode (Encode (Transformation) [Encode (Situation) ] ) 
= Transformation [Situation ]. 
Using a representation need not involve distal access, nor must distal 
access involve representation. Thus our interpretation of this dis- 
tinction is that it should be possible to have representation without 
symbols and symbols without representation. 
(2) The definition of intelligence in terms of approximation to a knowledge- 
level system. This definition distinguishes the concept of intelligence 
from the concepts of knowledge, level of performance, and generality 
by defining intelligence with respect to a goal to be how well the 
extant knowledge is used in selecting actions for the goal. So, lack of 
knowledge implies ignorance, but not lack of intelligence. Failure to 
perform at a high level could result from a lack of intelligence, but 
could just as well arise from a lack of either the appropriate knowl- 
edge or goals. Generality, rather than being an inherent attribute of 
intelligence, becomes the scope of goals and knowledge possessed; and 
general intelligence becomes the ability to exhibit intelligence across 
a wide range of goals and knowledge. Note that though intelligence is 
defined in a universal manner, the intelligence exhibited by an agent 
need not be unitary, and can in fact be quite domain-specific because 
the ability to use knowledge effectively may not be the same across 
different ranges of goals and knowledge. 
(3) Describing human action in terms of a hierarchy of system levels 
which are characterized by time scales roughly an order of magnitude 
apart. For example, at 1 ms is the neuron level, at l0 ms is the 
neural circuit level, and at 100 ms is the deliberate-act level. These 
levels then aggregate into bands that share a phenomenal world. The 
biological band consists of three levels concerned with the physical 
structure of the brain: the neuron and neural-circuit levels, plus one 
lower level. The cognitive band consists of three levels concerned 
with symbol processing: the deliberate-act level plus two higher ones. 
The rational band consists of  three levels concerned with intendedly 
rational behavior; that is, humans at these levels approach knowledge- 
level systems. 
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Many of the reviewers comments are focused on foundational topics, though 
not limited to just these novel contributions. 
The third theme, not surprisingly, engenders a large number of comments 
from the reviewers. Even those who share the same assumptions on unified 
theories and foundations generally have quite different notions about what 
the right architecture is for cognition, and about how one ought to go about 
developing and studying it (including, in particular, what data should drive 
its development). This is in fact one of the major messages of UTC--that 
Soar is not being proposed as the right answer, but as an exemplar (both 
Purves and Arbib appear to overinterpret the claim being made about Soar), 
and that others should take up the challenge from their own perspectives 
(and with their own driving data) and develop alternative unified theories 
of cognition. However, it is also clear that with all of  Soar laid out in 
UTC, it becomes an irresistible target for comment (and that this isn't 
really inappropriate). So, given that the reviewers go beyond the book's 
use of Soar, to fundamental comments on its nature, we will feel free 
to also go beyond the book in responding; in particular, we will refer to 
results generated since the book's completion wherever they seem relevant 
to discussions of the architecture and of how it is being developed and 
studied. In general, we will only provide references for work not already 
cited in UTC. 
In the body of this response we focus on the principal comments on both 
of these latter two themespfoundations and Soar. Related analyses of some 
of these same issues, along with analyses of some additional issues, can be 
found in [8,16]. 
2. Foundations 
Two of the three foundational themes that were expected to be contro- 
ve r s i a l - (2 )  defining intelligence and (3) the bands (and levels) of human 
cognition--did indeed provoke the lion's share of comments, along with one 
topic that surprised us, though perhaps it shouldn't have: theories. These 
three topics are discussed in this section, along with two other topics that 
had fewer, but still significant, comments: natural language and evolution. 
2.1. Defining intelligence 
Fehling and Hayes-Roth have several questions about Newell's proposed 
definition of intelligence. We've already commented on the question of 
whether intelligence is a unitary quantity or whether intelligence can vary 
by domain. A second question is the extent to which intelligence is really 
independent of knowledge. Newell clearly meant that adding a new piece of 
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knowledge relating goals to actions doesn't increase intelligence. However, 
we don't think he also meant that there is no way to increase intelligence by 
adding meta-knowledge. It seems quite consistent with the basic definition 
to say that adding a body of meta-knowledge, M, that makes the system 
better able to use another body of knowledge, B, can make the system more 
intelligent with respect to the uses of  B. 
A third question about the definition of intelligence is whether a system 
that performs perfectly within a very narrow region (such as a thermostat) is 
more intelligent than a system that performs less perfectly over a wide region 
(such as a person); or, similarly, whether a system that performs perfectly 
via a trivial method (such as table look-up) is more intelligent than one that 
performs less perfectly via a more sophisticated method (such as reasoning 
from first principles). This is an interesting question that seems to reduce 
to three fundamental components: ignorance, generality, and complexity. 
First, if an agent doesn't know the first principles, then it may certainly 
be ignorant, but not necessarily unintelligent. Likewise, if it knows both a 
perfect table and an imperfect set of first principles, it is more intelligent with 
respect to those goals to use the perfect table in answering rather than the 
first principles. Second, what should make the first principles advantageous 
is not their substandard use for goals where the table is applicable, but 
their use for other goals where the table is inapplicable. Thus this is an 
issue of generality rather than intelligence. Third, there appears to be an 
implicit appeal to the notion that something that is more complex (or 
sophisticated) is more intelligent. It is often assumed that complexity is a 
sign of intelligence, but what must really be meant is the ability to cope with 
complexity when needed (we've all seen too many complex descriptions that 
could really have been expressed quite simply). Using the first principles 
where the table is applicable would be inappropriate complexity. However, 
if the system knew the principles, but could not use them when they might 
help with other goals, that would indeed be a failure of intelligence. 
A fourth question about the definition of intelligence is whether it ignores 
important phenomena such as: "a system's allocation of limited cognitive 
resources, its ability to focus attention, its efforts to meet real-time con- 
straints, its balancing competing demands and opportunities for action . . . .  " 
(Hayes-Roth). The answer to this question is that intelligence is about how 
closely a physical system can approximate the knowledge level; that is, the 
issue is how the lower levels can provide a rational band. The phenomena 
Hayes-Roth mentions are precisely about how a physical system can best 
reflect its knowledge and abilities in resource-limited situations. Thus, sys- 
tems exhibiting these phenomena are likely to be judged more intelligent by 
the knowledge-level definition than systems that do not. 
Rather than being directly concerned about the definition of intelligence, 
Schank and Jona are concerned about the definition of AI. They take an 
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eclectic approach that has more in common with Newell's list of constraints 
that shape the mind (p. 19) than with his proposed definition of intel- 
ligence. In Schank and Jona's view AI consists of four topics: learning, 
memory organization and access, functional constraints + knowledge analy- 
sis, and scale-up. All of  these topics, except for knowledge analysis (which is 
discussed in Section 2.2.2), do appear to be covered in Newell's list. Schank 
and Jona also appear to leave important topics out, such as performance, 
reasoning, problem solving, planning, and natural language, but without a 
more detailed description of what they had in mind, it is hard to say much 
concrete about this apparent lack. 
2.2. Bands and levels 
Arbib has a general concern that the bands and levels described by Newell 
are too influenced by their roots in serial 1971-style computers, and thus 
generally inappropriate for describing human cognition. However, we don't 
see how a careful reading of the relevant figures in UTC could be taken 
as supporting this concern. Instead, it appears that Arbib is confusing the 
hierarchy of computer systems (Fig. 2-3, p. 47) with the time scales of 
human action (Fig. 3-3, p. 122). For example, though a register-transfer 
level appears in the former figure, there is no sign of it in the latter figure. 
Likewise, the symbol level in the latter figure--which occurs at ,~,~10 msec 
and is identified with the biological level of neural circuits--is in no way 
inherently serial (see, for example, how this level is mapped onto Soar in 
Fig. 4-23 on p. 224). We thus don't see how Arbib's concerns are relevant 
to the levels Newell describes in Fig. 3-3. 
2.2.1. The cognitive band 
The remaining concerns tend to be about Newell's focus in UTC on the 
cognitive band, with only limited attention being paid to the rational and 
biological bands (and even less to the others). This focus comes in for some 
sharp criticism from the reviewers who think it is either too restricted or 
completely misplaced. 
In terms of the focus being too restricted, Arbib is concerned that an 
attempt is being made to restrict the scope of cognitive science to rational 
behavior, to the exclusion of everything else; and, in particular, to the 
exclusion of subjects such as instinctive behavior. However, this seems to us 
to be a misreading of UTC in several ways. First, Newell clearly recognized 
that models of all of the bands were necessary for a complete model of 
human behavior. Second, the rational band is the home of rationality, not the 
cognitive band. In the cognitive band there can easily be procedures which 
can be executed, but not examined, thus providing "knowing how" without 
"knowing that". For example, Soar is "aware" of the contents of  its working 
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memory, but it has no way to directly examine its productions--indeed, 
it can only execute them. Instinctive behavior could thus be represented 
at the cognitive band as unexaminable proceduralized content (such as 
productions) that is innate and fixed, or indeed simply as part of the 
architecture. 
In terms of the focus being misplaced, Schank and Jona, and Arbib, are 
concerned that too much attention is being paid to the cognitive band and 
too little to the rational or biological bands (respectively). Fehling and 
Purves appear to go beyond this concern to a claim that only one band 
matters, though they are in complete disagreement as to whether it is the 
rational (Fehling) or biological (Purves) band. These concerns and claims 
about the misplacement of the focus are considered in more detail next. 
2.2.2. The rational band 
Fehling believes that the utility in models of cognition comes from com- 
petence theories, and that one key aspect of this is the utility of modeling 
knowledge rather than mechanism. This aspect is clearly a variation on the 
expert-system slogan that "Knowledge is Power", as are Schank and Jona's 
comments that ". . .  the important thing to study, if one wants to understand 
the nature of intelligence and build intelligent systems, is content not ar- 
chitecture." and "Knowledge is what determines the architecture." We can't 
disagree with the importance of explicitly studying knowledge, nor with the 
claim that this has not so far been a central scientific component of the Soar 
research enterprise. There has been some focus on knowledge, particularly 
in situations where the functionality being provided is both particularly im- 
portant and provided in a non-obvious manner (such as when it provides 
a new form of learning behavior). There has also clearly been a significant 
amount of informal study of knowledge in the context of  applying Soar in 
various domains. Nonetheless, these activities have not been a large part of 
the overall enterprise. 
Though we do expect the explicit study of knowledge to be a continually 
growing component of the Soar research effort, this should not be thought 
of as taking away from the central importance of studying the architecture. 
The human cognitive architecture is the fixed structure that makes the 
human mind what it is. It distinguishes people from other animals, and 
enables people to acquire and effectively use the wide range of knowledge 
that then lets them perform effectively in such a diversity of domains. In 
natural systems, at least, the architecture (plus the world and the already 
extant knowledge) determines what knowledge the agent can and does have, 
not the other way around. In general, without an architecture, knowledge is 
nothing more than useless scribbles, and without an appropriate architecture, 
intelligence (and thus performance) can be severely degraded. 
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Fehling also believes that a clean separation should be maintained between 
mind and brain (rather than attempting to ground mental constructs in the 
physical structures of the brain). He is therefore concerned that Newell is 
requiring all cognitive theory to be grounded in the physical structure of the 
brain, and that this is unworkable, unnecessary, and inappropriate. However, 
here we can only assume that Fehling has radically misunderstood UTC. The 
notion of a system level implies that it is possible to build theories at various 
levels of the hierarchy without attending to the details of  lower levels. Such 
theories can, in fact, be extremely useful in their own right; a fact that 
Newell was well aware of, and himself took advantage of throughout his 
career. Thus there is definitely no intent in UTC to claim that all cognitive 
theories must be so grounded. However, to the extent that the desire is to 
get an understanding of human cognition at all levels and/or  the extent to 
which the level boundaries are not hard, a one-level (or one-band) model 
is insufficient. This is not particularly pernicious nor behaviorist--it freely 
allows the use of "mental" terms--it  just hopes to eventually understand 
how they are grounded, no matter how indirectly or complexly, in the lower 
levels/bands. What Chapter 3 of UTC represents is an initial attempt by 
Newell to help lay some of the groundwork for bridging the gap between the 
cognitive and biological bands (see [1] for a small additional step in this 
direction). There is a very long way to go here still, but the problem has 
to rank as one of the most important and challenging problems in modern 
science. 
2.2. 3. The biological band 
Purves' primary concern with UTC is "its consistent failure to deal with 
the essence of cognition, that is, the brain and what is presently known 
about it." The strong version of this claim is that neurobiological evidence 
is primary, and that nothing of true importance can be done without it. 
We find such a claim hard to take seriously, for two reasons. The first 
reason is that equivalent claims can be made by all bands with respect to 
those above them; for example, physicists could just as easily claim that 
chemists should stop speculating about how the world works, and "put 
on their overalls, open the hood, and take a look"; and chemists could 
make the same claim about biologists. The fallacy, of course, in all of this 
is that each band talks about different phenomena and captures different 
regularities, and thus has its own appropriate technical languages and models. 
Understanding the relationships between the bands is ultimately of central 
importance to science; however, it can't replace studying each of the bands 
in its own right. The second reason is that ultimately the proof is not 
in such argumentation, but in what research paths lead to understanding 
cognition. To take one example from UTC, is Purves ready to claim that 
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neurobiology can, any time in the near (or even relatively distant) future, 
make zero-parameter predictions about the amount of time it will take a 
human to execute a computer command as a function of how the command 
is abbreviated? Or, to take an important example from elsewhere, can 
it tell us anything about how students learn, and fail to learn, subjects 
like mathematics? These two tasks stand in for a whole class of results 
from the cognitive (and, indeed, rational) band that have both increased 
our understanding of human cognition and have had significant practical 
impact. On practical impact, though the command-abbreviation result has 
not itself had significant economic impact, closely related results have--  
just one such result saved NYNEX $2.4M per year [4]. More broadly, the 
whole area of expert systems is a spin-off from the study of the cognitive 
and rational bands. 
The weak version of Purves' comment is that UTC is weaker than it 
would have been had it taken neurobiological data into account (a view 
which appears to match Arbib's). We are quite willing to believe that this 
might be true, as it is also likely true with respect to linguistic data and a 
variety of other bodies of data about human behavior. However, a signifi- 
cant breakthrough in bridging the gap between Soar and neurobiology will 
probably need to wait for the development of individual researchers who 
are sufficiently proficient in both of these topics. 
Beyond Purves' general concern, he also has a more specific concern about 
the timings assigned to particular levels. He discusses how the brain can 
actually make discriminations based on time differences much smaller than 
the , -~ 1 msec rate suggested for the neuron level; in fact, it seems to be able 
to discriminate intervals as short as ~ 1 0  psec. While we are impressed 
with the cleverness of how the brain appears to accomplish this, it is hard 
to see how it bears on the issue of the time scale(s) on which the brain 
functions. The leading model of auditory localization appears to be that the 
brain can respond differentially as a function of the correlation between 
the signals from the two ears [17]. The problem is that there need be no 
relationship between the time to compute this correlation and the size of 
the temporal interval that the correlation then implies. Thus, it is quite 
consistent for the brain to take milliseconds to compute these microsecond 
differences (though we have not actually seen any data on the exact time 
course). 
2.3. Theories 
Concerns about Newell's usage of theories includes the (lack of) method- 
ology for studying and evaluating them, the question of their identifiability, 
the nature of theoretical form and content, and competence theories. 
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2. 3.1. Methodology 
Hayes-Roth is concerned with the development of a "rigorous methodol- 
ogy for describing, analyzing, and empirically evaluating complex cognitive 
theories". We agree with her general call to arms, though realize that de- 
veloping such a methodology will be a difficult and extended process. One 
subpoint worth additional comment is the relationship between a theory 
and its implementation. Based on the notion of theory development that 
Newell expressed, this issue, along with the related issue of when a theory 
should be adopted or rejected (Fehling), loses some of its force. To Newell, 
the implemented architecture was the theory, implementation hacks and 
all. The hacks are just part of the approximate nature of the theory. Since 
incorrectness of one part of a theory is not to be grounds for rejecting the 
whole theory, this amount of approximation is quite consistent. However, 
this doesn't preclude having part of the theory stated outside of the context 
of  the implementation. It merely says that all of the implementation is 
part of it. It also doesn't obviate the development of a meta-theory; that 
is, an understanding of what parts of the theory are accurate, trustworthy, 
and significant. Such a meta-theory can be quite important in generating 
acceptance for the theory. 
However, in general, Newell felt that a theory is adopted by an individual 
or community if it is useful to them. If it is not useful--because it is wrong in 
some way that matters to them, or because they do not trust or understand 
it, or because there is some other theory that is more attractive--then they 
will abandon it (or never even pick it up). He did believe that there should 
be a minimal threshold a theory should meet before being taken seriously, 
and that the threshold should evolve over time as the standards set by 
existing theories climb. But among the contenders, the ultimate success of 
a particular theory was more to be determined by how far you could get 
with the theory than by careful comparisons between it and other theories 
(though, of  course, he did pay careful attention to a broad range of other 
theories, and particularly to whether they offered leverage in expanding the 
scope of extant unified theories). In the process, unsuccessful theories would 
just naturally be left by the wayside. He was thus much more concerned 
with extending his theories to cover new data than in detailed comparisons 
with other theories. In contrast, comparing his theories to data was always 
of central concern. 
2. 3.2. Identifiability 
Fehling (along with Pollack) is concerned with the issue of theory identifi- 
ability, whether it ever really goes away, and whether it makes the modeling 
of behavior (rather than competence) impossible. It may be that in some 
fundamental manner the identifiability problem can never go away. How- 
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ever, what Newell probably meant here is not that the problem isn't still 
there in at least a technical sense, but that as the body of data gets larger, 
the issue of identifiability fades in significance because of the increasing 
constraints under which all of  the theories must exist. If the total set of 
constraints on mind is finite, then ultimately any theory which satisfies 
them all is as good as any other. Even if there is an unbounded set of 
constraints--as Pollack might suggest--as long as the significance of the 
newly discovered constraints eventually follows a predominantly decreas- 
ing trend, the significance of the identifiability problem will also decrease 
correspondingly. 
Even if you accept that the identifiability problem will always matter, 
the conclusion Fehling draws from this~that  it is therefore only possible 
to focus on competence theories--just seems plain wrong. All scientific en- 
deavors have identifiability problems, including the endeavor of developing 
competence theories--at best a competence theory provides one body of 
knowledge that is sufficient for generating some class of behaviors, but it 
does not show that it is the only such body of knowledge. What scientists in 
general must do is first find at least one theory that works, and then as other 
theories arrive, understand in what ways they are equivalent, and what the 
differences (if any) mean. In the area of unified theories of cognition we are 
still very much in the phase of trying to find just one theory that meets all of 
the relevant constraints. With respect to Pollack's concerns about basing a 
theory on a "Universal Programming Language", he is correct in surmising 
that Newell relies heavily on constraints derived from robust psychological 
results to distinguish among possible theories; however, these constraints 
are in no sense extra-disciplinary, as UTC is all about modeling the human 
mind. 
2.3.3. Form and content 
Pollack is concerned about the use of "natural law" versus "software law". 
However, it appears to us that he is conflating two distinct issues heremone 
of form and one of contentmneither of which makes his point about UTC. 
The first issue is whether a theory is expressed in terms of mathematical 
equations versus process descriptions (i.e., what most programming lan- 
guages provide). Neither form has an a priori claim to appropriateness as 
a basis for theory expression. What matters is whether a theory of the do- 
main can be represented appropriately in the form--for  example, whether a 
system's knowledge, goals, and processes can adequately be expressed--and 
whether the theory as so expressed supports answering the key questions we 
have about the domain. The second issue is whether or not a "theoretical" 
structure is about anything. Both mathematics and computer languages can 
be used to create arbitrary abstract structures that, while possibly quite 
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beautiful, may have nothing to do with how the world (or the mind works). 
When AI engages in such activities, it has much in common with pure 
mathematics (in both the positive and negative senses). However, when the 
structures are used to model natural activities--such as the phenomena peo- 
ple exhibit when behaving in the world (or in a lab)--what is being talked 
about is as much natural law as are theories expressed as equations. Even 
such rational-band theories as competence models are statements of natural 
law to the extent that they model, at some level of abstraction, classes of 
activities that do (or can) occur in the world. 
Fehling is concerned that Newell is relegating all AI theories other than 
Soar to the ashbin of "content-free" frameworks. However, it looks to us 
like Fehling has misinterpreted two parts of  Newell's original statement. 
First, "content-free" is intended to refer to the fact that the frameworks 
make no content commitments that would keep them from being a neutral 
(but convenient) language for implementing any theory. It is not intended 
to imply that these frameworks are themselves vacuous in any way. Second, 
by saying that a unified theory of cognition is not a framework, Newell 
meant that it should really be a theory--that is, it should make commit- 
ments about how things work--rather than being a theoretically neutral 
(but expressive) framework or programming language within which any- 
thing could be encoded. Neither of these points was intended to denigrate 
existing frameworks, nor to say that other AI architectures could not be 
considered as possible unified theories of cognition. 
2.3. 4. Competence theories 
Fehling believes that theories of competence are more useful than theories 
of behavior. However, utility clearly depends on application. If you actually 
do want to predict human behavior--so that you can teach effectively, or 
counterplan, or design an aircraft cockpit that minimizes the number of pilot 
errors, or any number of other important applications--a competence theory 
is not enough. Likewise, if you actually want to build a working system that 
can exhibit a behavior (or competence), a competence theory is not close 
to being enough. Being concerned with performance is clearly shared with 
the behaviorists--as in fact, it is shared with nearly all other approaches in 
cognitive psychology, AI, and cognitive science--but this certainly does not 
make the approach behaviorist. The behaviorists did get some things right. 
2.4. Natural language 
Dennett is concerned about the role natural language plays in providing a 
representational medium, and the extent to which this distinguishes humans 
from other animals. We'll have to be quite speculative here, as we don't know 
what Newell thought about this, and we are not ourselves experts in this area. 
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So, what we will do is use Soar as a stand-in for Newell. The most natural 
prediction from Soar here is that the key difference between human and other 
animal cognition is in the architecture, and that natural language is based on 
the basic efflorescence of adaptation provided by the human architecture, 
rather than itself being the primary source (see, for example, [9] for thoughts 
on natural language in Soar). However, this prediction doesn't rule out there 
being specialized problem spaces (and representations within these spaces) 
for natural language, and their providing general capabilities that can be 
recruited for use in arbitrary tasks. For example, recent work on Linguistic 
Task Operators in Soar is examining how natural-language representations, 
along with the operations defined on these representations, can be used in 
solving parts (or all) of specific problems [10]. 
Minsky wonders about the origins of nouns and verbs in Soar. This issue 
can also be dealt with only in a rather speculative fashion. However, it 
should not be too much of a stretch to imagine them as arising as the 
linguistic correlates of states (or parts of states) and operators, respectively. 
These are Soar's primitive notions of objects and actions. 
2.5. Evolution 
Understanding the evolutionary path by which the human mind evolved 
is a fascinating scientific problem, and one in which Pollack, Arbib, and 
Minsky are all deeply interested. Newell clearly understood the importance of 
the evolutionary constraint on the architecture--as evidenced by its presence 
in Fig. 1-7 (p. 19) as one of the core constraints on the shape of the mind-- 
but was also just as clearly not ready to deal with it. We are also not ready 
to deal with this constraint in any detail, other than to notice, with respect 
to Minsky's comments, that evolution is constrained by both the material 
it has to start with--that is, the initial organism--and the environment in 
which the organism must exist (that is, the task environment). Only by 
understanding the interactions among these two constraints will we be able 
to get a true sense of the extent to which evolution prefers bizarre over 
elegant solutions and complex over simple solutions. 
Despite the admitted importance of the evolutionary constraint, no one 
should be misled into believing that the ordering evolution imposes on 
cognitive functioning need provide the best--or even a particularly good-- 
ordering in which to go about studying and modeling the mind. To use a 
problem-space metaphor, this would be equivalent to claiming that the best 
way to understand a state in a space is to understand its parts in the order 
they were generated by the sequence of operators that led to the state. What 
this neglects is that states (and organisms) tend to be structures with stable 
interactions among their parts--if organisms were not, they probably could 
not survive--and which can often best be understood directly in terms of 
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these interactions, rather than through the possibly convoluted means by 
which the stability was reached. 
3. Soar 
The following discussion of Soar is organized around whether the com- 
ments being responded to are about memory, scaling up (including integra- 
tion), task domains, seriality, emotion, or comparisons with other architec- 
tures. 
3. I. Memory 
Schank and Jona are concerned about a lack of organization of Soar's 
productions into higher-level units, a lack of attention to how memory should 
be accessed, and a lack of emphasis on preparation (that is, use of memory) 
rather than deliberation (that is, search). Minsky is also concerned about 
memory access and about whether Soar can have specialized representations 
(and whether they can be learned, or must be innate). 
3. I. 1. Organization 
We surmise that Schank and Jona are being misled by the surface syntax of 
the memory structures and are thus missing the deeper semantic organization 
that does exist. Soar's productions do not simply comprise a fiat memory 
structure. Instead, they are semantically organized around the objects-- 
i.e., the goals, problem spaces, states, operators, and other miscellaneous 
subobjects--to which they are relevant. For example, each problem space 
has a cluster of productions that define it. Likewise, each operator has a 
cluster of productions that define how it should be applied (as well as when 
it should be considered and when it should be selected). Such clusters of 
productions are only eligible for execution when their corresponding objects 
are active in working memory. When examining Soar's productions it is easy 
to miss this structure, as it is buried in the conditions of the productions. 
However, one of the main advantages of this approach is that a large 
variety of objects can be dynamically (and flexibly) constructed during 
execution--according to the cluster of productions whose conditions make 
them relevant--rather than being limited to only instantiations of those 
object classes predefined in something like a long-term frame hierarchy. 
In addition to the organization provided simply by having these objects, we 
have recently come to realize that the objects themselves are organized into 
a full-blown new processing level, called the problem space computational 
model [14]. At this level, Soar is appropriately described as consisting of 
a set of interacting problem spaces, where each problem space effectively 
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realizes a constrained micro-world. Languages defined at the problem-space 
level, such as TAQL [2 l] ,  specify systems directly in terms of problem-space 
components (and can be compiled automatically into Soar productions). 
3.1.2. Specialized representations and innateness 
Minsky is concerned about whether Soar has specialized representations. 
Soar definitely can utilize specialized representations because individual 
problem spaces may have their own representations that are constructed in 
terms of the uniform low-level attribute-value structure. This has proven ad- 
equate for the tasks so far investigated, but we do not yet know whether it will 
remain so in the future, or whether we will need to add new representations-- 
for example, for spatial information--to the architecture. 
Minsky also wonders about the knowledge-genesis issue of whether Soar 
would be able to acquire specialized representations, along with the ability 
to convert rapidly among them, or whether it really needs to be born with 
them. Soar currently doesn't come born with specialized representations-- 
except for the limited way in which they are provided by the "default" 
rules that are always loaded into Soar on start-up--and though we don't 
currently know whether or not they could be learned in general, a two- 
pronged approach to resolving this issue does seem clear. One prong is to 
investigate in some detail whether (or how) such knowledge could indeed 
be learned by Soar. The other prong is to continue accumulating evidence 
about the capabilities humans have at birth. If the conclusion is that the 
representation and conversion capabilities must all be there at birth, there 
would then still be the question as to whether it exists as innate content 
(that is, as productions or whole problem spaces), or as architecture. Either 
could appear physically in the brain as "specialized sub-organs". 
3.1.3. Access 
Schank and Jona are concerned that the issue of how memory should be 
accessed has received insufficient attention in Soar. However, the problem 
really appears to be not that it hasn't been dealt with in Soar, but that it 
has been dealt with in a different manner than in, for example, case-based 
reasoning. In case-based reasoning, the usual assumption is that memory 
consists of large-grained declarative structures that are processed little at 
storage time, except for some work on indexing. The understanding and 
adaptation of the case happen later, at retrieval time. In Soar, much more 
of the processing occurs at storage time. In fact, storage effectively occurs 
as a side-effect of the understanding process, resulting in the information 
usually being proceduralized with respect to the current context into a set 
of  small-grain rules, each of which becomes indexed by those aspects of  
the situation that determined its consequences. The only form of auto- 
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matic (that is, architecturally driven) adaptation that occurs at retrieval 
time is instantiation and combination (of object fragments from multiple 
rules). More intensive adaptation of retrieved structures is possible, but 
must be driven by knowledge (i.e., productions) or by more deliberative 
processing in further problem spaces. It would be quite easy to get into an 
extended debate about the relative merits of these two approaches to mem- 
ory access--and of  whether phenomena such as encoding specificity (p. 321 ) 
favor one approach over the other--however, the important message to be 
taken from here is that significant attention has been paid to the index- 
ing of knowledge in Soar. In fact, indexing is most of what the learning 
mechanism spends its time doing (i.e., figuring out what conditions to place 
on a production). 
Minsky expresses related concerns about Soar having too easy a time 
in accessing arbitrary pieces of  knowledge: ". . .  in Soar all knowledge is 
assumed to be uniformly accessible, so there is nothing to bar the central 
processor from accessing anything ...". However, two factors make such 
accessing more difficult than it appeared to Minsky. The first factor is 
that, though the working-memory contents of one problem space can be 
examined by other problem spaces, the productions cannot be. Productions 
can only be executed, and then only in the context in which they match. 
The second factor is that the specialized representations which get built up 
within individual problem spaces can make it impossible for one problem 
space to understand the working-memory contents of another space without 
solving the kinds of integration problems that are discussed in Section 3.2. 
3.1.4. Preparation versus deliberation 
Here we can only surmise that our propensity to talk about how flexible 
Soar is as a searcher has misled Schank and Jona into believing that Soar 
favors deliberation (search) over preparation (use of memory). It was 
hopefully clear from UTC that Soar uses memory (encoded as productions) 
whenever it has i t--and we usually try to make sure it does have it, or can 
learn it. Search only arises as a response to uncertainty and as a court of last 
resort when the available knowledge is insufficient (pp. 96-97). One of the 
things we have learned over the years is that problem spaces are about much 
more than search--they also provide a deferred-commitment control strategy 
that allows decisions to be postponed until run time (and which also turns 
out to make room for the kind of"dynamic planning" that Arbib is concerned 
about),  constrained microworlds for focused deliberation, a forum for error 
recovery, and a means of bootstrapping into task formulation [ 14]. We thus 
have no strong quarrel with the claim that cognition is 90% preparation and 
10% deliberation, though the exact numbers must be confirmed with good 
data. 
Response 405 
3.2. Scaling up 
Schank and Jona, Hayes-Roth, and Pollack are all concerned about scaling 
up, which is, of course, a major issue for any proposed intelligent system. 
Three subissues are raised by Schank and Jona: 
(1) Size: Whether the architecture can cope with large numbers of pro- 
ductions. 
(2) Integration: Whether you can scale the knowledge just by adding in 
the productions from a bunch of independent tasks. 
(3) Transfer: The amount of cross-contextual transfer of learning that will 
Occur .  
Pollack's concerns about the construction of large-scale systems and Hayes- 
Roth's programmatic suggestions both fit in well with Schank and Jona's 
concern about integration, and are therefore discussed in that context. 
3.2.1. Size 
Recent evidence shows that, for at least one significant task--message 
dispatching--Soar can scale up to over 10,000 productions without a signif- 
icant loss of speed [3], and more recent results extend this to over 100,000 
productions [2]. More clearly needs to be done here--and will be--however, 
these results should at least allay some of the scale-up fears. 
3.2.2. Integration 
None of us believe that you can build an integrated large-scale system 
by just adding together a bunch of productions created for different tasks. 
Because problem spaces provide Soar with an approximation to a modular 
structure, you often can just throw the problem spaces from multiple tasks 
together. However, what you get then is a system which can do the tasks 
individually, but not particularly a system that understands how to com- 
bine them in any effective way. There is integration that needs to go on 
with knowledge--i.e., among the problem spaces--just as there is for the 
architecture. 
What we do know about knowledge integration in Soar is that problem 
spaces interact through impasses; that is, when a problem space gets stuck, 
additional problem spaces can be brought in to discover the information that 
will allow the original one to proceed. Chunking then provides a permanent 
transfer of  the knowledge integrated together from the additional spaces to 
the original space. The integration of the chunked rules into their new space 
is relatively straightforward, as the nature of chunking automatically ensures 
that the new rules are already in the language of the space for which they are 
learned--the chunks' conditions and actions are all derived from existing 
working-memory elements in this space--and the decision cycle provides 
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an openness of knowledge access that enables new rules to contribute their 
preferences to whichever decisions they are relevant. 
Problem-space interactions are normally modulated by hand-coded pro- 
ductions that: 
(1) determine which spaces are considered and selected for which im- 
passes; 
(2) create initial and desired states in the new problem spaces as a 
function of the structure and content of the existing context hierar- 
chy (particularly including the immediately preceding impasse and 
problem space); and 
(3) return results to the original problem space. 
This approach has worked fine as long as it is possible to predefine the classes 
of  interactions that will arise. However, it falls short of the ideal, which 
would be to provide the potential for any problem-space to be used for any 
impasse for which it might be relevant--and to thus enable knowledge from 
arbitrary spaces to migrate, via chunking, into other spaces as appropriate. 
Soar does provide a framework that may make this ultimate integration 
possible, in that it allows the activities of problem-space generation and 
selection, initial and desired state creation, and result returning to become 
first-class tasks for the system to work on. However, the super-analogical 
problem of how, in general, two previously-unrelated problem spaces can be 
brought into correspondence, so that one can aid the other, is a question 
that we are only now beginning to seriously address within Soar. It is a great 
problem though (and clearly not just for us). 
Hayes-Roth recommends a program of research that is focused on the 
cumulation and integration of knowledge (probably from much the same 
intuition that underlies the CYC project). That seems like a fine idea to us, 
though clearly a very difficult enterprise, as Hayes-Roth acknowledges. In 
our own judgement we have so far been reasonably successful in following 
her recommendation with respect to the architecture, but much less so 
with respect to the content within the architecture. The reasons are several, 
including: 
(1) the architecture is tightly controlled by a small group of  people, 
whereas the content is developed diffusely over a large loosely-coupled 
distributed community; and 
(2) the architecture contains a relatively small number of reasonably 
robust algorithms, whereas the content houses a large amount of 
fragmentary, ill-specified, heuristic knowledge (as it should). 
The research effort mentioned above, as well as some of the new tasks we 
are going after (partly described in Section 3.3), are intended to help drive 
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us further in the direction of knowledge integration. Even so, it can still 
frequently be useful to back off from the ideal Hayes-Roth presents, and 
to look at independent integrations of partial capabilities in specific tasks. 
When it is not possible to see a straight-line path to the integration of a 
complete new robust capability--which is, in fact, frequently the case--such 
partial integrations can be a great way to build the scientific base that should 
eventually support the full integration required (and can also be an easy 
way to incorporate many loosely coupled researchers). 
Pollack proposes "building systems from the bottom up using robust and 
stable cooperatives of goal-driven modules locked into long-term prisoner's 
dilemmas" (presumably based on nonlinear dynamical systems). There is 
a lot of general common sense in this prescriptionmcreating stable, ro- 
bust modules and developing a stable organization of themmthough the 
effectiveness of the particular approaches he advocates (such as long- 
term prisoner's dilemmas) is much less clear, as is the relationship of 
these approaches to existing large-scale system-construction methodologies 
that attempt to resolve the same basic issues. Specifically with respect 
to Soar, we see that problem spaces provide "goal-driven modules" that 
interact through the relationship of impasse resolution. Within problem 
spaces there are semi-independent objects (states, operators, etc.) each 
constructed out of productions (or more problem spaces). The produc- 
tions themselves tend to be significantly more independent than those in 
most systems because of the lack of conflict resolution--productions fire 
in parallel, with behavioral arbitration occurring outside of the produc- 
tion system, via preferences and the decision procedure. All of  this gives 
Soar a form of modularity that should help in the construction of large- 
scale systems. However, it is impossible to tell at this time whether this 
is enough---even when combined with the growth potential provided by 
chunking--or whether it is any better or worse than the approach Pollack 
describes. 
3.2.3. Transfer 
We do currently see a lot of  transfer within and across problems from the 
same class of tasks; however, we do not yet see a great amount of cross- 
contextual transfer. Since such transfer is likely to be a direct function of 
the amount of commonality among the processing across different contexts, 
it is also probably related to the degree to which particular problem spaces 
can be used in different contexts, and thus a function of the amount of 
integration that can be achieved (as just discussed). Additional integration 
will thus probably help, but we would never expect to see a huge amount of 
cross-contextual transfer. The evidence on analogy and encoding specificity 
suggest that such transfer is actually quite limited in humans. 
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3.3. Task domains 
Both Hayes-Roth and Schank and Jona are concerned about the set of 
tasks used in driving the development of Soar. Hayes-Roth is concerned that 
the psychological tasks are too low-level and artificial to be informative-- 
and may just "reflect artifacts of  biological hardware ' - -and that the AI 
tasks may have nothing to do with intelligent behavior (or might reflect 
super-intelligent behavior). Schank and Jona are concerned that paying 
attention to "unrealistic and unnatural" psychological tasks--as opposed to 
the more realistic tasks that AI can study but that psychology has more 
trouble studying--will both lead to a distortion in the resulting theory and 
distract effort away from the more important realistic tasks. Let's divide 
this issue up into two parts: (1) whether there is a right set of tasks to 
be working on; and (2) if so, what they are, and where Soar stands with 
respect to them. 
On the first part, we are pretty sure we know what Newetl would have 
said: There is no right set of  tasks. People are not special-purpose devices 
that can only work on one type of task. Indeed, any single task can lead to a 
micro-theory that is overoptimized with respect to its own narrow domain, 
and that is thus severely distorted with respect to the full complexity and 
richness of  human cognition. So, what really matters is not what task is 
covered, but what diversity of tasks are covered. 
On the second part, we sympathize with the call for AI to study more 
realistic and naturalistic tasks. A key feature of such tasks is that they often 
contain within themselves enough essential diversity to keep the resulting 
micro-theory from being extremely narrow to begin with. The Soar com- 
munity has put a fair amount of energy into understanding how Soar can 
perform in reasonably complex knowledge-intensive domains, both in terms 
of replicating existing systems and in terms of constructing novel ones. The 
domains range over such areas as computer configuration, medical diagno- 
sis, algorithm design, blood banking [7], message dispatching [3], factory 
scheduling [5], browsing [15], and playing video games [6]. These are 
realistic tasks tl~,at people do perform, but they may seem to fall some- 
what short on the scale of "naturalism". We have not yet looked much at 
performing everyday tasks, and that would be a useful addendum to the 
classes of tasks that we have examined. Perhaps the closest we have come is 
nascent work on how Soar can be used as the basis for developing human- 
like intelligent agents in large-scale, simulated, physical environments. This 
is a "real" task in the sense that the simulation environments are developed 
by groups outside of the Soar community, the environments have signif- 
icant value for those groups, and they have a direct need for intelligent 
agents in these environments. This is also a reasonably naturalistic task, as 
it deals with multiple intelligent agents--some human-controlled and some 
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computer-controlled--in realistic physical situations; however, they do not 
quite tend to be "everyday" situations. 
Despite our general sympathy with the reviewers' calls to more realistic 
and naturalistic tasks, we also believe that controlled experimentation with 
more limited tasks can provide valuable information that can be difficult- 
to-impossible to derive from more complex tasks; for example, the rich 
bodies of data on controlled versus automatized performance, on memory, 
and on practice. Newell has already stated the rationale for this better than 
we could have, but the basic idea is that these short time-scale tasks--i.e., 
tasks requiring hundreds of milliseconds up to small numbers of seconds-- 
are the ones that get close to the architecture, by eliminating much of the 
flexibility that humans have at longer time scales. To date, Hayes-Roth's 
concern about these phenomena being mostly artifacts of the biology (or in 
Newell's terms, phenomena of the biological band) have not been realized. 
We have been successful in modeling a number of tasks at this level--such 
as visual attention [20] and transcription typing--with functional models 
based on ~ 5 0  msec operator-execution times. In general, as long as you 
don't restrict yourself to the micro-theory developed from a single such task, 
and in fact strive for coverage across a broad range of both realistic and 
controlled tasks, the danger of getting a fundamentally distorted view can 
be reduced greatly, while the amount of useful information available can be 
increased greatly. 
3.4. Seriality 
Minsky is concerned about Soar's "selecting and executing productions-- 
that is, IF-THEN rules--one at a time". However, here Minsky seems 
to have fundamentally misunderstood the parallel nature of Soar. It is 
serial at the level of  problem-space operations, but quite parallel below that: 
productions match and execute in parallel, and preferences are generated and 
decisions made in parallel. (Of course, when we implement Soar on a serial 
machine, this parallelism can only be simulated, but parallel implementations 
have also been investigated [ 19 ]. Because Soar does embody this parallelism, 
many of Minsky's arguments about what would be difficult to do quickly 
enough in Soar don't go through. To take just one specific example, recent 
work on garden-path sentences in Soar shows precisely the kind of rapid 
shift of interpretation about which Minsky i,~ concerned. In this work, 
an ambiguous sentence is not a garden-path sentence precisely when it is 
possible to repair, in real time, from the incorrect interpretation of the 
sentence to the correct one [11]. 
Arbib is also concerned about the seriality of computers (and Soar) versus 
the parallel/distributed nature of brains. Part of  the problem with this con- 
cern is that, as with Minsky, Arbib appears to have missed Soar's inherently 
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parallel nature. However, a further problem with this claim is that there is 
strong evidence for something like serial processing in human cognition; for 
example, the large body of results on (parallel) automatized processes versus 
(serial) controlled/attentive processes [ 18 ]. In his final remarks, Shiffrin 
summarizes as follows: "Behavior in general is accomplished by limited, 
perhaps serial, attentive processes operating in parallel with numerous au- 
tomatic processes, with the two systems passing information back and forth 
at all levels of  analysis." (p. 805 ). Soar is, at least at a gross level, consis- 
tent with these results, as the productions produce (parallel) automatized 
behavior while the problem spaces produce (serial) controlled behavior. 
3.5. Emotion 
Dennett's primary concern about Soar is its being all business, with no 
pain, pleasure, playfulness, laziness, etc. There is no question that this is a 
rather large gap with respect to Soar's coverage of human cognition. Even 
if you abstract away from the purely biological aspects of emotion, there 
are large and well-documented effects of emotion on cognition--in many 
ways the issues are not unlike those concerning the interactions between 
cognition and perceptual-motor systems. So it is an important constraint, 
but not one that we yet know how to deal with. It will clearly need to be 
addressed some day and, when it is, it will almost certainly have an impact 
on the architecture. 
3.6. Comparisons with other architectures 
One of the things Minsky does in his review is to compare Soar directly 
with the Society of Mind. On the whole, we think he did an excellent job. 
The comparison helped us both to understand the Society of Mind better, 
and to understand some of the ways in which it does map quite nicely onto 
Soar (and vice versa). However, there are two aspects of the comparison to 
which we would like to add. 
The first addition is that, rather than mapping the Society of Mind's 
management function onto Soar's problem spaces, we would map it onto 
Soar's decision procedure, along with the knowledge and processing that 
generates the preferences used by the decision procedure. This knowledge 
may consist simply of productions that directly generate preferences upon 
execution, or it may consist of problem spaces that require arbitrary amounts 
of processing before being able to generate the appropriate preferences. When 
management is by the former, it doesn't require impasses or deliberate 
processing, and can proceed in parallel for many activities. This would also 
be quite compatible with Minsky's notion that "The managers themselves 
are installed as consequences of impasse-resolving episodes", as these are 
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exactly the circumstances under which chunking installs new productions in 
Soar. 
The second addition concerns Soar's apparent lack of the concept of a 
"difference", which is so central to the Society of Mind. Soar does indeed 
not have a large-grained, architectural, difference-detection mechanism that 
compares arbitrary pairs of  structures. However, it does have at its very core 
a fairly general match capability that provides a small-grained difference- 
detection mechanism; that is, it can detect situations where a value bound 
in one condition of a production is not the same as the value bound in 
another condition. This capability supports, but does not mandate, large- 
scale structure comparisons. An important part of the philosophy underlying 
this choice is that difference detection is not a purely syntactic operation 
that can be applied to two arbitrary structures and yield meaningful answers. 
Instead it must be a knowledge-guided process that can be based on which 
differences really matter in particular contexts. The selective use of difference 
detection in the marcher is one way of accomplishing this. This choice is also 
consistent with the overall philosophy underlying Soar's approach to problem 
solving. In contrast to systems such as GPS, Soar is not locked into a single 
problem solving method such as means-ends analysis (MEA). Instead it is 
to be free to use whatever methods are supported by the knowledge it has 
about the task. Thus, if it has difference information, something like MEA 
is possible; when it doesn't have such knowledge, other methods should be 
appropriate; and when it has such knowledge plus additional knowledge, 
more powerful, possibly hybrid, methods should be usable. 
Arbib also compares schema theory with Soar, and generates similar 
conclusions. In particular, he proposes to map schemata onto problem 
spaces, but is then concerned about the resulting seriality. However, as with 
the Society of Mind's management function, it is not at all clear why the 
mapping shouldn't be extended to, at least, include Soar's productions as 
schemata. 
4. Summary 
If we pull up from all of the details, there are three major themes that 
we hope the reader takes away from this response. The first theme is that 
studying the architecture is important. No matter how much domain-specific 
power comes from the knowledge, there is no way to build a unified and 
effective theory of cognition without significant study of, and effort on, the 
architecture. 
The second theme is that no band of phenomena is special. Each band 
has its own data, methods, regularities, and applications. A complete model 
of human behavior requires understanding all of  them. Newell focused 
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primarily on the cognitive band in his career, and UTC represents his 
attempt to build a comprehensive theory of  the architecture--that is, the 
fixed structure--that gives this band its distinct shape. Unified theories of 
the other bands may take on quite different shapes, as might unified theories 
of  cognition that are based on other phenomena within the cognitive band. 
The third theme is that there is plenty of room--in fact, NeweU tried 
to explicitly encourage it--for others to develop their own unified theories 
of the cognitive (or any other) band. As the theories grow, and the set of  
phenomena covered by them begins to converge, we expect that some of 
the theories will die (from an inability to grow further), while others will 
themselves start to converge, if  not in their surface structure, then at least 
in their essence. Be warned though, that the development of  such theories 
can be an immense undertaking, requiring the integration of a rather vast 
amount of  both expertise and manpower. And even then, there will always 
be significant gaps and inconsistencies that can be criticized. Nonetheless, 
there are few research paths more exhilarating than trying to put it all 
together. 
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